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Abstract
This paper tests directly a geography and growth model using regional data for Europe,
the US, and Japan during di®erent time periods. We set up a standard geography
and growth model with a poverty trap and derive a log-linearized growth equation
that corresponds directly to a threshold regression technique in econometrics. In
particular, we test whether regions with high population density (centers) grow faster
and have a permanently higher per capita income than regions with low population
density (peripheries). We ¯nd geography driven divergence for US states and European
regions after 1980. Population density is superior in explaining divergence to initial
income which the most important o±cial EU eligibility criterium for regional aid is
built on. Divergence is stronger on smaller regional units (NUTS3) than on larger ones
(NUTS2). Thus, the wavelength of agglomeration forces seems to be rather small in
Europe. Human capital and R&D are transmission channels of divergence processes.
Human capital based poverty trap models are an alternative explanation for regional
poverty traps.
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This paper revisits the debate on conditional income convergence vs. club conver-
gence of regions within countries in the light of economic geography.1 Against this
background our formost interest is to examine whether (endogenously determined)
\peripheral" regions have been catching up or falling behind center regions.
These questions are at the heart of regional economic policies. For example, the
main idea behind EU regional policies is one of \harmonious development" with the
aim of \reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions",
as laid out in Article 130a of the Treaty of the European Union. The justi¯cation
for this is not only political, but also economic, since it is said that \the disequilibria
indicate under-utilisation of human potential and an incapacity to take advantage of
the economic opportunities that could be bene¯cial to the Union as a whole". This
re°ects an understanding of the regional growth process according to which some
regions are trapped into lower development levels, out of which they cannot be lifted,
when left to market forces alone. However, both the empirical evidence and the
robustness of the underlying theoretical model substantiating this view are far from
unequivocal.
For instance, a well-known implication of neoclassical growth theory is that
per capita income approaches at a decreasing growth rate its long-run steady state
level, whereby the latter may di®er across countries, regions, or cities depending on
a set of structural variables (Solow, 1956). Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) found
comprehensive cross-section evidence for this hypothesis using country- and regional
data of the US, Japan, and Europe. Glaeser, Sheinkman, and Shleifer (1996) argue
that population growth should be used instead of income growth in regional growth
regressions, because migrants arbitrage away income di®erences across regions, but not
across countries. Based on their concept, they ¯nd evidence for population growth
convergence of US-cities.
1For de¯nitions of unconditional convergence, conditional convergence, and club convergence see
Galor (1996).
1Nevertheless, there is some theoretical and empirical work that does in principle
support the EU commisions view (though without necessarily making a strong case for
the e®ectiveness of EU regional policy). A large body of poverty trap models predict
the emergence of convergence clubs: Starting from the same initial conditions and
the same structure of the economy, some countries may become rich and others stay
poor.2 Durlauf and Johnson (1995), Quah (1996), Hansen (2000), and Easterly and
Levine (2001) provide evidence for club convergence in cross-country datasets. On
European regional level, de la Fuente and Vives (1995), Neven and Gouyette (1995),
Esteban (2000), Quah (1997a,b), Marcet and Canova (1995), Canova (1999), Boldrin
and Canova (2001) and Straubhaar (1999) ¯nd a process of convergence until 1980,
and a stop of convergence or even an increase in divergence within the EU countries
together with further convergence across the EU countries.3
One particular type of a poverty trap is a core-periphery pattern of economic
activity - i.e. a spatial concentration of economic activity - that emerges in the pres-
ence of scale economies, imperfect competition, transport cost, and worker migration
(Krugman, 1991, and Krugman and Venables, 1995, Fujita, Krugman and Venables,
1999). A core-periphery pattern may also occur if some regions specialize in R&D
activity (Martin and Ottaviano, 1999, 2001), if there are local inputs subject to scale
economies (Englmann and Walz, 1995), or if (human) capital accumulation diverges in
space (Baldwin, 1998, Baldwin and Forslid, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, Baldwin, Martin, and
Ottaviano, 2000, Urban, 2000). There exists empirical evidence for country data that
\natural geography" such as access to ports or climate matters for the steady state
income level of a country (Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger, 1999). Moreover, there is am-
ple indirect and direct evidence for economic geography models such as most recently
Redding and Venables (2001).4 Spatial econometric studies such as Rey and Montouri
(1999) show that income of a US state is dependent on the income of neighbour states.
2A survey of poverty trap models is Azariadis (1996).
3A recent survey is Puga (2001). More favorable for the convergence hypothesis is de la Fuente
(2000). Overman and Puga (2001) point out that a di®erent measure of inequality - the unemployment
rate - shows an even more pronounced divergence than GDP.
4A survey is Overman, Redding, and Venables (2001).
2Junius (1997) shows that the degree of urbanization increases in the take-o® stage of
industrialization, levels o®, and ¯nally decreases as countries grow richer.
Our research objective is di®erent in that we explore, whether there is club con-
vergence of cores and peripheries. We do not ask whether some structurally identical
regions grow rich, while others stay poor, but whether center regions grow rich, while
peripheries stay poor. For this purpose, we merge a neoclassical growth model with
a core-periphery model and derive a reduced form that corresponds to a threshold
regression model in econometrics (Hansen, 1996, 1999, 2000). We derive theoretically
that centers di®er from peripheries by their population density. Then, we estimate
endogenously, which regions are centers and which are peripheries, and test, whether
centers grow faster than peripheries and remain permanently richer.
We also compare how the use of population density as a threshold variable
compares to other potential threshold variables. In choosing which alternative thresh-
olds to use we have been constrained by the availability of data. Of those that were
available we have selected the ones which can be interpreted as (part of) the criteria
that the EU commission applies when deciding whether a region quali¯es for regional
policy intervention. Therefore, our exercise may also be seen as a validity test of the
o±cial EU criteria. The use of other threshold variables also enables us to test for
other club-convergence models.
We ¯nd that centers remain permanently richer than peripheries in the US
and Europe after 1980, while there is none for Japanese prefectures and European
regions before 1980. Moreover, human capital and R&D are transmission channels of
divergence. The divergence is stronger on a smaller regional unit (NUTS3) than on a
larger regional unit (NUTS2) which suggests a rather short wavelength of agglomera-
tion forces in Europe. Surprisingly, population turns out as superior threshold variable
to initial per capia income (which is one of the EU's main eligibility criteria), as far
as the European regions after 1980 are concerned. Human capital based poverty trap
models ¯nd also some empirical evidence.
3The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up a theoretical
model and derives a reduced form for estimation; section 3 provides the empirical
evidence; Section 4 contains a short summary.
2 The Theoretical Model
We will ¯rst set up a neoclassical growth model version of a typical geography model
(Krugman, 1980, 1991). There are two regions - home and foreign - and foreign vari-
ables are denoted by a star (*). Foreign may be thought of as the \rest of the country".
We will only state the equations for the home region. Corresponding equations will
hold for foreign. There is one manufacturing sector with monopolistic competition,
increasing returns to scale technology, and instantaneous free entry and exit at any
discrete period of time t.
Representative consumers save by maximizing their utility function V subject
to a dynamic budget constraint and some initial conditions5:






where d is a discount factor and Et[:] is the usual expectations operator conditional
upon information up to period t. There is exogenous population growth and produc-
tivity shock growth unless assumed otherwise. The average growth rates are identical
in both regions, but temporary stochastic deviations are allowed for.
The consumption basket Ct is de¯ned as a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) type CES-












;¾ > 1; (2)
where £t is the set of all domestic and foreign goods, cjt is the domestic consumer's
consumption of the manufacturing good j, where the index j contains all domestic
and foreign ¯rms.6
5The consumer optimization problem including the constraints and initial conditions is stated in
a p p e n d i x2 ,e q u a t i o n( 2 9 ) .
6In monopolistically competitive markets, every ¯rm produces a di®erent good.
4The budget constraint of the representative agent is thus:
X
j²£t
pjtcjt + St · Y
N
t ; (3)
where pjt denote factory gate product prices, St is savings, and Y N
t is nominal income.
Firms di®er only by their location.7 There are ¯xed cost that give rise to
increasing returns to scale on plant level. In particular, ® units of an input basket vt
is used to install the production process every day (maintenance work) and ¯ units
are used to produce each unit of goods for the domestic and the foreign market xt:
vt = ® + ¯xt; (4)






The input basket vt consists of human capital kt,( r a w )l a b o u rlt, and some exogenous
i.i.d. productivity shock parameter At.8 We assume immobility of human capital
u n l e s si ti se m b o d i e di nr a wl a b o u r . 9 Initially, human capital per capita is equally
distributed. Raw labour may be distributed asymmetrically. To start with, we assume
immobility of labour. Then, there will not be a change in the relative distribution of
labour except for temporary deviations, since population grows at the same average
rate in both regions. We will show in section 2.2 that results will go through under
the assumption of migration of (some) labour.
A unit of human capital is created by all varieties of goods. For simplicity, we













7Hence, we can suppress the index j of the ¯rm that produces good j. We distinguish only foreign
¯rms from domestic ¯rms by a star (*).
8A deterministic time-trend of the productivity shock variable could easily be added without
changing conclusions.
9Introduction of physical capital into the model in addition would not a®ect results, if it is perfectly
mobile and ownership is not too unequally distributed. We exclude it, because we do not have a useful
measure of it for our regional data.
10This way of modelling (human) capital follows closely Baldwin (1998).
5where It is the human capital investment aggregate used by the ¯rms in the home
country and ¶jt is demand of the typical domestic ¯rms for human capital goods pro-
duced by all domestic and foreign ¯rms j. We also assume a 100 per cent depreciation
rate such that next period's human capital stock is equal to this period's investment





pjt¶jt = PtIt: (6)
Finally, there are trade costs of the Samuelson iceberg-type for manufacturing
goods, such that only a fraction ¿ of one produced unit of a good arrives at its foreign
destination (0 <¿<1).
The within-period consumption maximization problem, ¯rms' optimization,
and the market clearing conditions are solved following closely Urban (2000). The














where pt and pex¤
t are the domestic producer prices and export prices of domestic and
foreign ¯rms charged to consumers in the home country, respectively. Firms optimize
















where rt is the return to human capital in the home country at time t and wt is the
11It is well-known that speci¯c dynamic optimization problems with logarithmic functional forms
can easily be solved without loss of substantive generality, if this depreciation assumption is employed.
See, for example, Stokey and Lucas (1989). The loss of generality concerns only the adjustment path.
Since we will have to log-linnearize this path anyhow in the empirical speci¯cation, the depreciation
assumption is not restrictive for our purposes.
12See d'Aspremont et. al. (1996) for a discussion of this result. Note also that ¯rms optimize
under certainty, because contemporary shocks are known and there is no link in the ¯rm optimization
problem to the future.
6wage rate in the home country.13 Factor demand of ¯rms is given by:
rtkt = "ntpt; (9)
wtlt =( 1¡ ")ntpt:
Foreign consumers fully bear the transport cost. Because of free entry and exit of
¯rms, pro¯ts are zero. This condition yields an expression for income of the home
country:
ntptxt = Ktrt + wtLt ´ y
N
t : (10)





where we normalized without loss of generality ®¾ ´ 1a n d¯ ´ 1¡®.F r o mt h ea b o v e
equation and the factor market clearing condition we obtain an equation relating the






Note that economy-wide technology shocks are fully absorbed in °uctuations of ¯rm
entry and exit.
Finally, the goods market equilibrium condition for one typical manufacturing



















1¡¾ =1 ; (13)
where q ´ ¿¾¡1 for notational simplicity: Following again the steps in Urban (2000), we
summarize the goods market equilibrium conditions in the following equation where
13The constant c is de¯ned as: c = "¡" (1 ¡ ")
"¡1.
7we conveniently de¯ne the terms of trade ½t ´
p¤
t














We de¯ne for future reference from the equation (14) the correspondence ½t = ½(Nt)
and note that relative producer prices depend positively on the relative number of
¯rms. Combining (3), (11), (13), and the depreciation assumption, yields:
Kt+1 = ¼tnt ¡ Ct; (15)
where we de¯ne for convenience ¼t ´ (pt=Pt): Now, we make a guess for a consumption
function that optimizes expected utility of consumers around some steady state to be
de¯ned later:
Ct = d0¼tnt; (16)
where d0 is a parameter yet to be determined. We will later con¯rm this guess to be
valid. Inserting (16) and (12) into (15), yields ¯nally:





This is the di®erence equation of the home region that summarizes the basic model
together with its counterpart for the foreign region under the assumption that the
guess (16) is valid.
2.1 Steady-States and Stability
Our ¯nal objective is the empirical test of the model (17). First, we have to con¯rm the
guess and to determine the steady states and their corresponding stability properties.
We proceed by taking the logarithm of the ratio of (17) for the foreign region




Nt+1 = "ln(1 ¡ d
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Nt is the ratio of foreign to domestic ¯rms in terms of e±ciency units14, ½t (Nt)
is given by (14) and recall that Et (lnL¤
t ¡ lnLt)a n dEt (lnA¤
t ¡ lnAt)a r ea s s u m e dt o
be time-invariant constants, while at least L¤
t and Lt may be growing. This di®erence
equation and the exogenous equations of motion of the e±ciency parameters are suf-
¯cient to describe the behavior of the relative number of ¯rms Nt which corresponds
to aggregate regional output, since output of a single ¯rm is a constant (see equation
(11)).
Next we determine the steady state equilibria.
Proposition 1: Assume that population Lt;L ¤
t °uctuate randomly around the same
deterministic trend and At, A¤
t are i.i.d. random variables. Then, the di®erence
equation given by (18) with (14) has either one or three ¯xed points. If it has three
¯xed points N¤;N¤¤;N¤¤¤,w i t hN¤ <N ¤¤ <N ¤¤¤;then N¤ and N¤¤¤ are stable, while
N¤¤ is unstable.
Proof: See appendix 1. Q.E.D.
This proposition establishes multiplicity of steady state equilibria for some parameter
values and uniqueness of equilibria for some others. While the regime with a unique
steady state equilibrium is exactly the case of conditional convergence of a neoclassical
growth model, the regime with multiple steady states describes the case of a poverty
trap.15 An explicit condition that distinguishes the two regimes does not exist.16
Proposition 2: If the time preference rates, technology, utility, and average popula-
tion growth rates are identical across regions and the dynamic system given by (18)
with (14) starts with an equal distribution of capital, but an unequal distribution of
labour, and the stochastic shocks of At;A ¤
t;L t;L ¤
t are too small to change the basin
of attraction, then the steady state N¤¤¤ is approached, if over the entire time path
14I.e. Nt divided by A¤
t=At.
15The economic intuition for these results has been given carefully in a very similar model in Urban
(2000).
16Such an explicit condition can be found if all structural variables and in particular the labour
distribution are identical for both regions.
9an average labour distribution L
¤
> L holds, the steady state N¤ is approached, if
L
¤
< L; and N¤¤ =1is approached, if L
¤
= L;where N¤ <N ¤¤ <N ¤¤¤ and bars
denote steady state values.
Proof: See appendix 2. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 establishes that the initial population will be an important deter-
minant for whether a region becomes a center or a periphery. If structural parameters
such as productivity and savings rates are (slightly) dissimilar across regions, then
there will still be a threshold value of a relative labour distribution that determines,
whether a region becomes a center or a periphery, but the threshold value will not
be an equal distribution of labour and will have to be estimated empirically. The ap-
propriate operationalization of the threshold variable is population density, whenever
transport costs are uniformly depending on distance.17
Finally, we are ready to verify the guess on the consumption function.
Proposition 3: The linear guess for the consumption function (16) is the optimal so-
lution to the maximization problem of consumers (1) subject to the resource constraint
(15) and the pricing equation (14), if d0 =1¡ d" is chosen.
Proof: See appendix 3. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 completes the dynamic analysis of the model for a given distribu-
tion of labour. The results so far are similar to Baldwin (1998), Baldwin and Forslid
(1999, 2000a, 2000b), Baldwin, Martin, and Ottaviano (2000), but distinguish in that
the latter use endogenous growth models which are inconsistent with the empirical
results of growth regression analysis of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995). Urban
(2000) has provided an exogenous growth model version in continuous time rather
than discrete time, without stochastic shocks, and regional asymmetries which are
all necessary features for the empirical implementation of the model. Finally, Urban
17This follows from Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) and will be discussed in section 2.4 in
depth.
10(2000) lacks the discussion of a migration process which will be discussed next.
2.2 Initial Migration
Static geography models such as Krugman (1991) imply that a region grows faster
as long as there is migration. Migration was a typical phenomenon in the beginning
of the age of industrialization. Massive migration from the countryside to the cities
was observed and a relatively uniform space became asymmetric, i.e. centers and
peripheries were formed. Nowadays, very little migration can be observed, but income
divergence may still be driven by an uneven distribution of the population in space
which is inherited from the age of industrialization.18
The purpose of this section is to show within this geography and growth model
that there will be an initial massive migration which will lead to an unequal dis-
tribution of population across regions. Then, the center - i.e. the region with more
population - starts growing faster by accumulating more human capital. Such a model
speci¯cation can be regarded more relevant for the typical sample periods which we
apply in the empirical part of this paper.19
For simplicity, we assume that there are two types of individuals: a fraction l
of the ¯rst generation is perfectly mobile from the second period of life onwards, while
af r a c t i o n( 1 ¡ l) is perfectly immobile.20 O®springs of immobile workers are also
immobile, while o®springs of mobile workers are also mobile. The average population
growth rate of each type is equal.21 Stochastic temporary shocks of the regional
18See Baldwin and Martin (1999a) for a careful empirical comparison of the two globalization
waves at the beginning of the industrialization in the 19th century and in the second half of the 20th
century. The di®erence of initial conditions is particularly stressed.
19Contemporary migration is rather small over the sample period in the sense that the population
density di®erences are persistent over the sample period. See Fischer and Straubhaar (1999) for the
i n t e r a c t i o no fm i g r a t i o na n di n c o m eg r o w t hi nE u r o p e .
20This assumption guarantees that some workers always remain in the periphery. It also guarantees
that migration will occur initially, while the growth process in latter stages is not interfered by
migration. The assumption that new-born workers can only move from the second period of life
onwards together with the assumption of stochastic population growth allow for temporary stochastic
deviations of a regions population from its long run value. This will enable us to use population growth
as determinant of income growth. Those assumptions ensure also that the model captures well the
stylized fact that migration was much more prevalent in the 19th century than it is now.
21Our migration process is modelled only rudimentary, because it is not the main focus of this
paper. Instead, we only need to justify, why population of industrialized countries are unequally
distributed in space, because the population distribution will determine the separation of growth
processes of centers and peripheries. For a more general forward looking migration process with
11population growth rate and technology are assumed to be su±ciently small to prevent
a center to turn immediately into a periphery. The migration decision is made in the
beginning of a time period, before the shocks of this period become public. Human
capital is embodied in a worker during the migration period. All productivity shocks
are set to 1 in this section for convenience.
Under these assumptions we can show in the next proposition that we obtain a
stable asymmetric distribution of the population from the ¯rst period onward (except
for temporary stochastic deviations caused by di®erential population growth).
Proposition 4: Suppose labour is equally distributed in space and the regions are
identical in all respects in period 0. In period 1, there is a massive migration towards
the center region. From this period onwards E (L¤
t=Lt)=L¤
L = 1+l
l > 1; w h e r ew ed e -
note the home region to be the center region by language convention. This distribution
of labour is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof: See appendix 4. Q.E.D.
Propostion 4 justi¯es the existence of an unequal initial distribution of the
population. In the proof in the appendix, we apply a subgame perfect equilibrium
concept. If all mobile workers have moved to the center, income in the center is larger
than in the periphery, since producer prices are larger in the center and consumption
price indices are lower. Thus real rental rates and real wages are also larger in the
center. If a mobile worker moves then from the center to the periphery at some time
period, she can a®ord less consumption and less human capital accumulation than as
if she had stayed in the center. Hence, the equilibrium in the center is stable. As
in Baldwin (2001), Krugman (1991b) and Matsuyama (1991), we have multiple equi-
libria in that it is indeterminate initially which region becomes the center. However,
our simpli¯ed migration process involves an instantaneous jump to the steady state
labour distribution and the problem of expectation driven formation of centers on the
transition path vanishes.
expectation driven equilibria see Baldwin (2001).
122.3 Derivation of Growth Equation and Tests
Next, we derive the reduced form of the growth equation in the presence of multiple
equilibria and a threshold. (17) may be rewritten by using (14) as











where yt is per capita income. Note that the term (pt=Pt) is non-loglinear. Therefore,





















Then, it depends, whether the home region is a center or periphery. If it is a center
(denoted by ¤) it's corresponding steady state value is larger as if it is a periphery









because we have shown in proposition 4 that there are more workers in the center and
in proposition 1 that there is more capital accumulation in the center.22 In practise,
inequality (21) implies that the steady state income per capita of centers is larger than
of peripheries.
Moreover, it has been shown in proposition 2 that the home region becomes a
center, if and only if L>L
¤
: Therefore, we employ in our empirical tests the following
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where °ij, i;j =0 ;1;2;3 are regression coe±cients, and ° is a threshold value that
splits the sample into two halfs. If all regions were completely symmetric in all vari-
ables and parameters except for the state variables, then theory suggests that ° is
22The rigorous proof of inequality (21) can be shown with some lines of algebra and is available
from the authors upon request.
13one. If regions are asymmetric, then ° is not known a priori. The main innovation of
the empirical part will be to estimate ° endogenously. This will enable us to estimate
which region is a center and which region is a periphery.
The variable technical progress (At+1) may be taken as unobservable or proxied
by a variable such as patent applications. We operationalize the threshold variable
L=L
¤
as population density. This operationalization follows from a continuous space
extension of the core-periphery model of Krugman (1991) which can be found in Fujita,
Krugman and Venables (1999). In this model, transport costs are proportional to
distance. Then, core-periphery patterns extend to spatial °uctuations and aggregate
variables are indexed by \unit" of space. Otherwise, the model results are preserved.
We will discuss informally the implications of continuous space below.
We will formulate three hypothesis. The ¯rst hypothesis is that there exists a
threshold ° such that centers grow di®erent to peripheries. Note that this includes
standard growth regressions µ a la Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) as null-hypothesis.
While the latter tested neoclassical growth theory against the alternative of an Ak-
model, we will test the same null-hypothesis against a model with multiple steady
states (poverty trap model).23
The second hypothesis is that centers reach a higher steady state income
level than peripheries conditional upon identical population growth and technical











0x] is the average score of the control variables upon which conditioning takes
place. These scores may be di®erent across center and periphery. This hypothesis will
23Bernard and Durlauf (1996) have pointed out that regressions testing for the convergence speed
larger than zero are \ill-designed to analyze data where some countries are converging and others are
not" (p. 167). Note that threshold regressions do exactly that.
24If we talk about a theoretical steady state income level, we do not intend to forecast future
income. For the latter we would need to exclude structural changes in the future which is implausible
over an in¯nite time-horizon. Instead, we view the theoretical steady state income level as an index
number that extrapolates contemporary growth performance into an immaginary time path.
14be tested with a non-linear hypothesis test.25
Our regional data is limited in the time dimension. Hence, we cannot employ
panel-estimations.26 This limitation may bias the test (23) if regional ¯xed e®ects
proxy signi¯cantly for omitted variables, di®er substantially across regions, and are at
the same time correlated with the convergence speed. Moreover, the test (23) assumes
a log-linear growth process.












which can be done with a standard (two-sided) group mean-di®erence test. The draw-
back of test (24) is that it imposes too strong a condition on divergence. Income
di®erences may be persistent, even if peripheries grow faster than centers but their
growth fades out too early. Moreover, no standard control variables are taken into
account. Hence, test (24) is a test on unconditional divergence.
The third hypothesis regards the discrimination of di®erent poverty trap mod-
els. By the choice of the threshold variable di®erent poverty trap models can be
directly compared with the geographical poverty trap model of this paper. For ex-
ample, many poverty trap models employ initial income as threshold variable (see
Azariadis, 1996). Others require human capital to be a threshold variable (Funke and
Niebuhr, 2001). In fact, a comparison of the coe±cient of determination (R2)o ft h e
respective threshold regressions with identical control variables su±ces to discriminate
among those theories.
Finally, we can also gain some information on the transmission channel of
divergence. Our theory suggests that either migration or human capital accumulation
25We can easily accomodate a common constant growth rate of technology by assuming a determin-
istic common time trend in At. As is well-known (see Solow, 1956), this yields a steady state growth
rate equal to the exogenous rate of growth of technology. Hence, a steady state income level does not
exist anymore. However, there exists a steady state income ratio of center relative to periphery that
is given exactly by the left hand side of (23) divided by the right hand side of (23). Thus this test
remains valid even in the presence of a common deterministic constant growth rate of technology.
The latter claim can be proven with a few lines of algebra which are available from the authors upon
request.
26Moreover, thereshold regression techniques have only been developed for non-dynamic ¯xed e®ect
models (Hansen, 1999), while we would need a dynamic panel threshold regression technique.
15drive divergence. We can control for e®ects of endogenous migration by instrumenting
population growth by its exogenous components of death and birth rate. We can
explore human capital as transmission channel by including it in the regression. If
a threshold is signi¯cant without human capital as control variable and it renders
insigni¯cant with human capital, then human capital is capable of explaining the
divergence in per capita growth rates if it is concentrated in centers. Likewise, R&D
may serve as another transmission channel of divergence which could be explored in
the same way.27
2.4 The \Right" Wavelength
We are restricting the theoretical model to two (types of) locations - a center and a
periphery. Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) have shown in a static-optimizing
new economic geography model that this is su±cient to understand the agglomeration
forces and convergence forces of the model. There arises, however, one problem in
the empirical implementation of a simple core-periphery model. In a continuous space
version, many di®erent types of regions may emerge. In fact, a continuous space model
can be described as a spatial wave.
This is depicted without further theoretical underpinning somewhat loosly in
¯gure 1, where the picture is strongly inspired by Fujita, Krugman and Venables
(1999). There is a di®erent income level and a di®erent amount of workers in each
spot in space. Centers and peripheries form as peaks and troughs of a wave.
Regional data are not measured in spots, but as averages on areas. Then,
it becomes important which level of regional aggregation those data have. If the
region size corresponds with the wavelength of agglomeration forces as in ¯gure 1,
then regional data will just show a pattern that is perfectly captured by a simple
core-periphery model.
27See Martin and Ottaviano (1996) for a geography and growth model with endogenous R&D
location decisions.





Figure 1: A Parabel to a Continuous Space Model - Perfect Match
The core-periphery pattern may not be recoverable, however, in a second case
which is depicted in ¯gure 2.





Figure 2: A Parabel to a Continuous Space Model - Regional Units Too Large
In ¯gure 2, regional borders are drawn such that each region contains both
peaks and troughs. Regional data on this level of regional aggregation will average
out center-periphery di®erences, although they are present.
Yet, another possibility of a mismatch of legal and economic borders arises
17which is displayed in ¯gure 3.






Figure 3: A Parabel to a Continuous Space Model - Regional Units Too Small
Region 2 Region 3
Now, a single spatial wave may cover many regional units. Then, threshold
regression techniques may identify more than one signi¯cant threshold. Moreover,
there will be spatial autocorrelation of the error term of the economic growth threshold
regression. We will explore the choice of wavelength by applying a Moran-I test of
spatial autocorrelation. If the test rejects spatial autocorrelation on a higher level
of regional aggregation, but accepts it on a lower level, while there is a stronger
sign of divergence on the lower level, then we conclude that the economic wavelength
corresponds to areas of a size inbetween the higher and the lower level of aggregation.
Summing up, it will be important in the empirical analysis to use di®erent
levels of regional aggregation to explore the empirical wavelength of agglomeration
forces. A spatial autocorrelation test may provide additional information.
3 Empirical Analysis
We ¯rst repeat the seminal study of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) by applying
threshold regression techniques of Hansen (1996, 2000) to their data on US states,
European regions, and Japanese Prefectures. Then we use Eurostat data for European
18regions from 1980 until 1996 both on NUTS2 and NUTS3 level28.
3.1 Econometric Speci¯cation
The growth equation (22) has a correspondence to econometrics. It is a threshold
regression model. A threshold regression model estimation involves three steps. First,
the optimal sample split threshold ° is estimated. Second, it is tested, whether the
optimal sample split is indeed signi¯cant. Third, conventional hypothesis tests can be
performed.
The optimal sample split is estimated by minimizing mean square errors, i.e.




where qi is the value of the threshold variable (population density) of region i, Q is
the set of all di®erent values of qi in the sample, ° is the optimal value of qi,a n d
e(qi) is the vector of OLS residuals of the regression (22) if the sample is splitted in
all observations which are larger or smaller than qi and each sample half is estimated
separately. This step enables us to estimate which regions are centers and which are
peripheries.
The signi¯cance of the sample split could be optained by a conventional struc-
tural break test (Chow Test). However, Davies (1977) has argued that this test is
invalid in the present context, because it assumes that the sample split ° is known
with certainty, while we estimate the optimal sample split °.AC h o wt e s tw o u l dn o t
take into account the estimation error of ° and the uncertainty whether the threshold
exists under the null-hypothesis. Hansen (1996) suggests a Supremum F-, LM- or
Wald-Test which has a non-standard distribution dependent on the sample observa-
28Eurostat uses 4 disaggregation levels of regional classi¯cations: NUTS0 corresponds to countries,
NUTS1 to states, NUTS2 to a group of communities or cities, NUTS3 to single cities or communities.
A description of the data is found in appendix 5.
19tions.29 The critical values can be obtained by a bootstrap.30 This way, we test the
validity of core-periphery growth patterns. Do centers follow a di®erent growth path
than peripheries even if we control for exogenous structural di®erences?
So far, we can evaluate whether centers and peripheries grow di®erently. Of
more interest is, however, the question whether centers become richer than peripheries.
Inequality (23) in section 2.3 speci¯es this hypothesis. Hansen (2000) proves that
conventional tests on the regression coe±cients as if ° were known with certainty
remain valid asymptotically. Therefore, we are able to apply conventional non-linear
tests to evaluate this hypothesis. If the threshold is signi¯cant but the steady states of
center and periphery are not signi¯cantly di®erent, then centers grow rich early in time,
while peripheries ¯rst diverge and converge later31. Moreover, an unconditional group
mean-di®erence test is valid for the same reason to test unconditional divergence, i.e.
(24).
Hansen (2000) has applied this technique previously to test for poverty traps
on country data. Canova (1999) estimates also thresholds for European regions. How-
ever, he uses a di®erent technique (Bayesian statistics) and does not test a speci¯c
geography model, but a general poverty trap model. We will compare his preferred
threshold variable with our estimations. Neven and Gouyette (1995) and Straubhaar
and Wolburg (1999) estimate growth regressions of European peripheries. However,
they do not estimate which regions are peripheries, but take as peripheries the south-
ern regions or the objective 1 regions as de¯ned by the European commission.
29We will employ a Supremum Wald-test if we encounter heteroscedasticity. In this case, we
choose the optimal sample split according to the test statistic rather than the mean square error as
in Hansen (2000). A software is available from Hansen in GAUSS. However, we employ our own
software written in STATA. Our software is more °exible as it allows to limit the sample break to a
subsets of variables. This is necessary to include country dummies. Our software has also an option
for instrumental variable threshold regression.
30Some theoretical upper and lower bounds are available from Andrews (1993). However, Diebold
and Chen (1996) demonstrate in a time series Monte Carlo study the superiority of bootstrap methods
in particular for small samples and for samples with autocorrelated error terms.
31This hypothesis may be found in a geography and endogenous growth model of Baldwin, Martin,
and Ottaviano (1998).
203.2 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) Data
We employ data on Japanese prefectures 1955-1990, US states 1900-1990 and European
Nuts 1 regions 1950-1990. The data are displayed and described in Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995). The results are displayed in table 1.
Regressions (1), (2) and (4) repeat a conventional OLS regression as in Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1992)32 for the purpose of comparison on Japanese prefectures,
US states, and European NUTS1 regions from 1950-199033, respectively. Accordingly,
the GDP growth rate is regressed on initial income and the population growth rate.
Additionally, we estimate the threshold of population density that splits the sample
best into center and periphery regions and test for the signi¯cance of it. Model (3)
is the result of threshold regression on US states reporting the di®erent regression
coe±cients for centers and peripheral regions.
A Supremum-LM test indicates a highly signi¯cant sample break for the data
on US states. However, there is no sample break for European regions and Japanese
prefectures. Hence, only US centers follow a growth path di®erent from peripheries.
Furthermore, the Wald test for di®erence of steady state income levels of centers
and peripheries suggests that centers of US states have a higher steady state income
level than peripheries at the 1 percent signi¯cance level. The US data provide strong
evidence that our theoretical model is empirically relevant for the US. Our ¯nding
that there is no evidence of growth divergence on NUTS1 level in Europe particularly
in the early post-World War period is in line with previous ¯ndings.34 To understand
the results for Europe better, we investigate next a di®erent time period.
32Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) use non-linear least squares estimation, while threshold regression
techniques are constrained to OLS estimation. Results are very similar, though.
33Data on European regions are di®erences of the dependent and each independent variable from
its country sample mean. This corresponds to a LSDV-estimator of country ¯xed e®ects. Hence, we
will not be able to recover the regression coe±cients of the constant term.
34For a survey, see Puga (2001).
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White-test 0.38 0.31 0.97 0.00***
Adjusted R
2 0.559 0.818 0.912 0.517
Observations 47 48 48 90
Remarks: Standard errors in parenthesis (heteroscedasticity corrected if White test significant);
*** is 99% significant; ** is 95% significant; * is 90% significant;
Modified LM-Test for significance of threshold: Hansen (1996): 1000 bootstrap replications;
Marginal probability in parenthesis;
Confidence intervall of threshold: Hansen (2000);
Wald-Test; H0: γ01/γ11=γ02/γ12: probability of H0 in parenthesis;
White Test for heteroscedasticity: probability of accepting homoscedasticity
3.3 Eurostat Data - NUTS2
3.3.1 Centers and Peripheries
We apply threshold regression to Eurostat data on European regions, NUTS2, during
t h ep e r i o df r o m1 9 8 0u n t i l1 9 9 6c o v e r i n g1 2E Uc o u n t r i e s . 35 In particular, we use data
on the regional average annual growth rate of GDP per capita in PPP units36,t h e
35For few regions no data on GDP were available for 1980. Instead, the year 1981 was taken in
these cases. For a precise data description see the data appendix which also contains the summary
statistics of all variables.
36Boldrin and Canova (2001) suggest to use average labour productivity instead of GDP per capita,
because labour market participation rates di®er widely across regions. However, labour productivity
22initial level of GDP per capita in 1980 or 1981, the average annual population growth
rate of a region, the average number of patent applications per capita over the period
1989-1996, the share of the population with university degree or equivalent in 199337,
and the population density (1000 inhabitants per qm2). GDP data are in nominal
PPP units. This means that regional di®erences in the price development have been
taken into account, but there is no correction of the common EU-in°ation rate. Our
results will not be a®ected by the lack of this correction.38
Before we enter a formal analysis, we describe the spatial distribution of initial
income in 1980/1981, of the average annual growth rate, and of population density.
Rich regions in 1980/1981 were concentrated in the geographic core of Europe, while
the poor regions of Europe were concentrated in the geographic peripheries. Of the
10 richest regions were 5 located in Germany, 2 in Belgium, 1 in France, 1 in the
Netherlands, and 1 in Italy. Typically, the richest regions were regions containing
major cities such as Brussels, Paris, Hamburg, Frankfurt, etc. In contrast, of the
10 poorest regions in 1980/1981 we observed 5 Greek, 3 Portuguese, and 2 Spanish
regions. Comparing the geographic distribution of income with the population density,
there is a close match.39
The geographic core has a much higher population density than the geographic
periphery. Among the regions with highest population density are 3 German, 3 Dutch,
a Greek, a Spanish, a French, and a Belgium region. (Often the region containing the
countries' capital), while among the 10 regions with the lowest population densities
are 4 Greek, 4 Spanish, a Portuguese, and an Italian region. This ¯nding indicates
that there must have been at some point in history a divergence in income growth
may not be a good measure of regional performance. Economic integration may increase European-
wide competition which may force local ¯rms to increase labour productivity by laying-o® workers
(especially in the presence of nation-wide labour contracts). As a result, labour productivity converges
and unemployment diverges. The latter has been found by Overman and Puga (2001).
37There is also a measure of secondary schooling available. However, it proved not to be signi¯cant
in our regressions.
38All constant terms of our regression will have to be reduced by the average annual EU in°ation
rate. The standard errors are not a®ected. Nor are the regression coe±cients of the other variables
or any test statistics. Note also that every regional income study with Eurostat data has faced this
problem.
39The correlation between GDP per capita in 1980 and population density is 0.38 for NUTS2
regions and 0.48 for NUTS3 regions.
23rates of regions with high and low population densities, respectively, or there must
have been migration from poorly growing regions to faster growing regions.
In any case, population density looks like a good candidate variable to be
included in more formal empirical regional analysis. This correlation tells nothing,
so far, about the contemporaneous growth performance of cores and peripheries in
Europe. The top growth performers have been Ireland and Luxembourg, and also
some Portuguese regions, while among the worst performers are mainly French, but
also Greek and Spanish regions.
To investigate more thoroughly, whether population density can explain di®er-
ences in growth performance, we turn to a formal econometric analysis using threshold
regression techniques. Table 2 displays the results for NUTS2 data. We provide the
results of cross-section threshold regressions of the GDP growth rate on initial in-
come, the population growth rate, patents, and human capital. Speci¯cations (1)-(3)
use OLS threshold regressions, while speci¯cations (4)-(6) apply instrumental variable
threshold regressions to take into account a possible endogeneity bias of population
growth, because one component of population growth - migration - may respond to
GDP growth.40 Di®erent estimations are made for center regions, i.e. regions with a
large population density, and peripheries, i.e. regions with low population densities,
where the cut-o® level is chosen optimally as described in section 3.1.
Starting with the baseline speci¯cation (1), we ¯nd that there is a highly sig-
ni¯cant sample split into centers and peripheries as indicated by a Supremum-Wald
test. The threshold value of population density that separates centers and peripheries
is a rather high population density of 345 inhabitants per km2. There are 115 periph-
eries and 39 centers. The unconditional average growth rate of centers is about 0.05
percentage points lower than in peripheries. But this di®erence is not statistically sig-
ni¯cant. In contrast, the theoretical conditional steady state of centers is signi¯cantly
40The validity of threshold tests is proven for OLS regressions. However, those proofs apply directly
to IV-estimation, because the latter are just a transformation of OLS estimators, where the transforms
obey exactly the assumptions required for OLS estimations.
24larger than the one of peripheries.41 Moreover, the convergence speed parameter of
centers is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, while it is for peripheries. Hence, we
cannot exclude endogenous growth in centers.
Adding succesively the control variables patents and human capital in spec-
i¯cations (2) and (3) of table 2, we ¯nd that the threshold is no longer signi¯cant
while both patent applications and human capital are signi¯cant according to stan-
dard t-tests. Moreover, the relative conditional steady state of centers and peripheries
are no longer signi¯cantly di®erent from each other if the control variables patent
applications per capita and human capital are introduced. At the same time, the un-
conditional growth rate of centers and peripheries is becoming larger. Hence, patent
application and human capital explain the steady state income di®erences of centers
and peripheries.42
In speci¯cations (1)-(3), we ¯nd that population growth is positively correlated
with GDP p.c. growth in centers, but negatively correlated in peripheries. This hints
at endogeneity of population growth. There may be immigration into centers, as
they may be expected to become richer in the future. Hence, there may be a positive
correlation. In the contrary, there may be emmigration from peripheries, since they are
expected to become poorer and the correlation may vanish or even become negative as
predicted by the theoretical model. To control for endogeneity of population growth we
reestimate the previous speci¯cations with instrumental variable threshold estimations
using the exogenous components of population growth, i.e. death and birth growth
rates, as instruments. In the baseline speci¯cation (4), results are very similar to the
OLS speci¯cation (1). The threshold remains valid, although it becomes even larger.
41The hypothesis is formulated in the theoretical part, equation (23). We report in table 2 an
LR-test result, because a corresponding non-linear Wald test proved not invariant to the hypothesis
formulation. This de¯ciency of the non-linear Wald test is well known. Greene (1997), p. 362f,
recommends to use an LR- or LM-test instead. We also calculated the LM-test with very similar
results to the LR-test without reporting them.
42It is important to recall that human capital and patent applications may be endogenous, because
human capital is measured in 1993 and patents as average from 1989 until 1996 rather than in 1980.
Unfortunately, we do not have appropriate instruments for those variables. Moreover endogeneity of
human capital may be caused by forward looking human capital investment decisions. Agents choose
a better education in centers, because they know that this attracts more ¯rms which renders human
capital investment more pro¯table and justi¯es ex post the larger e®ort into education. For those
reasons, human capital has to be used with caution in threshold regressions as control variable.
25Only the steady state income di®erence test is no longer signi¯cant. A Hausman
test con¯rms the validity of the chosen instruments. In the speci¯cations (5) and
(6) with patents and human capital as control variables the Hausman test indicates
that instruments are no longer valid. The estimation results are very similar to the
corresponding OLS estimations.
Eventually, we test for spatial autocorrelation. A Moran-I test indicates rather
low spatial autocorrelation which is mostly not signi¯cant at the 5% signi¯cance level.
Table 2: Threshold Estimation of European Regions, NUTS2, Threshold Population Density, 1980/1981-1996
OLS/ Country Dummies IV/ Country Dummies Dependent
variable: GDP
Growth
























































































Human Capital - - .006*
(.003)
-- . 0 0 6 *
(0.003)












































Wald test for country
dummies
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Hausman test - - - 0.03** 0.64 0.33
Moran-I test 0.13 0.15 0.10 0.19** 0.15 0.07
B.-Pagan test 0.00*** 0.21 0.51 - - -
Joint R
2 0.63 0.67 0.71 0.60 0.67 0.69
Observations 154 101 86 151 101 86
Remarks: Standard errors in parenthesis (heteroscedasticity consistent if Breusch-Pagan test
significant); *** significant at the 99% level; ** significant at the 95% level; * significant at the 90% level;
SupTest: SupWald- or SupF-test for significance of threshold: See Hansen (1996), heteroscedasticity correction
if Breusch-Pagan test significant, 1000 bootstrap replications, marginal probability in parenthesis;
Unconditional GDP growth difference between center and periphery: two-sided test for group-mean difference
with group specific variance; Relative steady state income per capita (H0: (γ01+E(β‘x))/γ11=(γ02+E(β‘x))/γ12):
Significance level from non-linear LR-test or non-linear Wald test; B.-Pagan-test: Breusch-Pagan test for
heteroscedasticity: probability of homoscedasticity; Hausman test for validity of instruments; instruments are the
average annual growth rate of birth and of death; Moran-I test for spatial autocorrelation (** indicates
significance at 5%-level); Unreported country dummies always included;
So far, we can conclude that population density is an econometrically valid
26threshold variable and it divides centers and peripheries such that centers get richer
than peripheries. The di®erence is statistically signi¯cant, but not robust to instru-
mental variable estimation. Our results on Europe both before 1980 and after 1980
matches those of de la Fuente and Vives (1995). They ¯nd regional convergence in
Europe before 1980 and a stop of the convergence process thereafter. We ¯nd even
some evidence of divergence of centers and peripheries with the re¯ned measurement
method of threshold regression using the same data.
3.3.2 Alternative Threshold Variables
Now, we ask whether there may exist a better threshold variable than population den-
sity. After all, the threshold variable population density distinguishes poverty traps
caused by geography models from other poverty trap models. We tried ¯ve alterna-
tives: initial income, the deviation of population density from its country mean, the
percentage change of employment in the manufacturing sector, the share of agricul-
tural employment in the population in the year199043, and human capital.
The results are displayed in table 3. Initial income is not a signi¯cant thresh-
old variable. Moreover, poor regions appear to grow signi¯cantly stronger than rich
regions. However, the test on the conditional steady state indicates that catch-up of
poor regions will not be complete and poor regions will stay permanently poorer than
rich regions. Interestingly, the estimated (insigni¯cant) threshold of initial income is
at 77% of the EU average GDP per capita income which is astonishingly close to the
actual eligibility criterium for regional aid by the EU of 75%. Compared to the popu-
lation density threshold regressions, initial income as threshold variable does far worth
according to the ratio of the two coe±cients of determination (relative R2). In this
respect, our study adds a superior threshold variable to the study of Canova (1999).
43De la Fuente (2000) suggests that regions with a larger agricultural sector have lower average
labour productivity. A move out of agriculture spurs thus also growth.

































































































































Breusch-Pagan test 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.04** 0.14
R
2 0.58 0.58 0.64 0.62 0.66
Relative R
2 0.92 0.92 1.06 1.01 1.03
Observations 154 154 91 126 100
Remarks: Standard errors in parenthesis; Robust standard errors if Breusch-Pagan test significant;
*** significant at the 99% level; ** significant at the 95% level; * significant at the 90% level;
Sup-Test: SupWald- or SupF-Test for significance of threshold: See Hansen (1996),
1000 bootstrap replications, marginal probability in parenthesis;
LR-Test; H0: (γ01+E(β‘x))/γ11=(γ02+E(β‘x))/γ12; probability of H0 in parenthesis;
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity: probability of homoscedasticity;
Relative R
2 is the ratio of R
2 of the considered threshold regression to the R
2 of a threshold regression
with the threshold variable population density and the same observations and control variables;
Unreported country dummies are always included;
We also ¯nd that the threshold population density is an absolute measure and
not country speci¯c as it would be the case if the deviation of population density from
its country mean would perform superior. However, a decline in manufacturing, a
high employment share in agriculture, and a low level of human capital are also sig-
ni¯cant threshold criteria and the corresponding threshold regressions have a superior
¯t to the one with population density. However, neither the steady state di®erence
test, nor the unconditional divergence test are signi¯cant if the agricultural share of
employment is used as threshold variable. The threshold variable \decline in manufac-
28turing employment" explains huge signi¯cant temporary growth rate di®erences, but
not permanent ones. Only regions with low human capital have a signi¯cantly lower
steady state level of income.44 The latter result con¯rms again that human capital
accumulation is an important transmission channel of divergence.
Summing up, we can conclude that among the EU eligibility criteria for regional
aid \decline in the employment share of manufacturing" obtains the strongest support
in our study if policy measures are temporary. If initial income is believed to be an
important eligibility criterium, then the chosen threshold - 75% of EU average income
- is astonishingly close to the optimal estimated threshold. Population density and
human capital are the only two signi¯cant threshold variables that explain persistent
long-run di®erences in GDP p.c. across centers and peripheries. Hence, a refocus
of regional economic policy towards increasing the demand of high-skilled labour in
peripheries may be advisable. This may be achieved by locating high-skilled public
employment such as universities and government agencies in peripheries.
3.4 Eurostat Data - NUTS3
Next, we explore divergence on a smaller level of regional disaggregation (NUTS3).
We use data on GDP per capita growth, GDP per capita in 1980, population growth,
population density, and numbers of patent applications per inhabitants.45 The data
cover 6 countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and Spain.
Patent data are mainly missing among greek regions. The distribution of NUTS3
regions is unequal across countries. The bulk of NUTS3 regions is found in Germany
(329), while other countries have much larger regional units, e.g. France has 88 regions.
In the light of ¯gures (1)-(3), this is not necessarily a problem if the wavelength
of agglomeration forces di®ers across countries. In particular, countries with low
population density like France and Spain are expected to have a larger wavelength
44Funke and Niebuhr (2001) ¯nd for German regions a signi¯cant threshold in human capital.
45Unfortunately, no data on human capital or the agricultural share of employment was available
on NUTS3 level. A precise data description with summary statistics is given in the data appendix.
29of agglomeration forces, because cities tend to be further away from each other, and
those countries are at the same time divided into larger regional units.
We apply the threshold growth regressions also to these data. The results are
d i s p l a y e di nt a b l e4 .
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Country Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

































Relative GDP per capita stea-















0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Hausman-test - - 0.00
*** 0.00
*** --
Moran-I test 0.25** 0.24** 0.22** 0.23** 0.26** 0.24**
Breusch-Pagan test 0.00** 0.00** - - 0.00** 0.00**
Joint R
2 0.2488 0.3067 0.22 0.29 0.2507 0.291
Observations 590 531 547 500 590 531
Remarks: Standard errors in parenthesis (heteroscedasticity consistent if Breusch-Pagan test
significant); *** significant at the 99% level; ** significant at the 95% level; * significant at the 90% level;
SupTest: SupWald- or SupF-test for significance of threshold: See Hansen (1996), heteroscedasticity correction if
Breusch-Pagan test significant, 1000 bootstrap replications, marginal probability in parenthesis;
Unconditional GDP growth difference between center and periphery: two-sided test for group-mean difference with
group specific variance; Relative steady state income per capita (H0: (γ01+E(β‘x))/γ11=(γ02+E(β‘x))/γ12): Significance
level from non-linear LR-test or non-linear Wald test; B.-Pagan-test: Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity:
probability of homoscedasticity; Hausman test for validity of instruments; instruments are the average annual growth
rate of birth and of death; Moran-I test for spatial autocorrelation (** indicates significance at 5%-level); Unreported
country dummies are always included;
Table 4 contains threshold regressions with the dependent variable GDP growth
per capita and the independent variables initial income, population growth and patent
applications per inhabitant. Speci¯cation (1) and (2) are the OLS threshold regres-
sions with the threshold variable population density; speci¯cations (3) and (4) apply
30instrumental variable threshold regressions46, and speci¯cations (5) and (6) use initial
income as threshold variable instead of population density for the purpose of compar-
ison.
Again, the threshold estimates are signi¯cant over all speci¯cations. However,
in the baseline speci¯cation (1) without patent applications as control variable centers
do neither grow faster nor are permanently richer in the steady state. Note also that
the threshold is rather low. However, adding patents as control variable in speci¯cation
(2) yields a much larger threshold value and both the steady state di®erence test and
the unconditional divergence test are highly signi¯cant. Centers now tend to grow
faster by about 0.22 percentage points. This would amount to an annual income
di®erence of 719 Euro between centers and peripheries in 1996 if the income level was
identical across center and periphery in 1980 at the EU average income level.
Next, we control for endogeneity of population growth by using the instruments
birth and death growth rates. Those instruments are valid according to a Hausman
test. Now, the threshold of speci¯cation (1) jumps to the one of speci¯cation (2)
even without patents and both the unconditional growth rate di®erence test and the
theoretical steady state di®erence test are signi¯cant. Moreover, the convergence speed
coe±cient cannot be rejected to be zero in centers which implies that there may be
endogenous growth in centers, but not in peripheries. The coe±cient of population
growth changes sign and becomes positive, but stays insigni¯cant which suggests some
mild degree of endogeneity of migration also on NUTS3 data. Patent applications are
again a highly signi¯cant and robust control variable across all speci¯cations.
The alternative threshold variable initial income is signi¯cant, but there is
neither a signi¯cant di®erence of the unconditional growth rate of poor and rich re-
gions, nor remains there a permanent income gap of poor and rich regions. Rather
leap-frogging occurs at the 10 % signi¯cance level in the speci¯cation with patent ap-
plications. Moreover, threshold regressions with the threshold variable initial income
46These estimations do not correct for heteroscedasticity. However, this is very unlikely to a®ect
our results.
31have a lower R2 than those with the threshold variable population density. We con-
clude that population density is a superior candidate to explain growth divergence in
Europe after 1980.
Next, there is stronger spatial autocorrelation on NUTS3 data than on NUTS2
data according to the Moran-I test. We refer for the explanation to section 2.4: spatial
autocorrelation of the error term on NUTS3- and weaker evidence of divergence on
NUTS2-data may indicate that some centers and peripheries fall together in some
NUTS2 regions, while several NUTS3 regions together may form a single center. In
other words, the wavelength of agglomeration forces is suspected to be somewhere in
between the regional disaggregation levels NUTS2 and NUTS3. Also the fact that the
threshold estimates on NUTS2- and NUTS3-data are fairly close suggests that both
data sets capture the same agglomeration forces.
The jump in the threshold from speci¯cation (1) to speci¯cations (2)-(3) sug-
gests the existence of several thresholds. Therefore, we test next the hypothesis of one
against two thresholds.47 We do ¯nd a second signi¯cant threshold both for speci¯-
cations (1) and (2) of table 4 which explains the puzzling result in speci¯cation (1).
There are no more than two signi¯cant thresholds. We present the results for the
¯nally preferred speci¯cation with two thresholds and patent applications as control
variable in table 5.
The two thresholds are close to each other at 290 and 210 inhabitants per km2.
The two low-population density groups are quite similar in terms of their relative
average unconditional growth performance. In fact, the middle group is quite small
(54 regions) and heterogenous in its GDP p.c. growth rates. Importantly, both the
unconditional divergence and the steady state income di®erence test are signi¯cant
between the highest population density and the middle population density group.
The unconditional divergence test is not signi¯cant with respect to the low population
47Hansen (1996) derives the convergence results upon which the bootstrap procedure of the thresh-
old test is built for only one threshold. Hansen (2000) points out that it is unknown whether his
testing procedure applies to several thresholds, but applies them nevertheless to this case. He sug-
gests a step-wise procedure. A ¯rst threshold is taken as given when a second threshold is searched
for, etc. We follow his algorithm.
32density group.
Table 5: Threshold Estimation of European Regions, NUTS3, Multiple Splits
in Preferred Specification, 1980/1981-1996
Threshold: Population Density
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Remarks: Standard errors in parenthesis (heteroscedasticity consistent if Breusch-Pagan test
significant); *** significant at the 99% level; ** significant at the 95% level; * significant at the 90% level;
SupTest: SupWald- or SupF-test for significance of threshold: See Hansen (1996), heteroscedasticity correction
if Breusch-Pagan test significant, 1000 bootstrap replications, marginal probability in parenthesis;
Unconditional GDP growth difference between center (defined as group with highest population density) and
periphery: two-sided test for group-mean difference with group specific variance; Relative steady state income
per capita (H0: (γ01+E(β‘x))/γ11=(γ02+E(β‘x))/γ12): Significance level from non-linear LR-test or non-linear Wald
test; B.-Pagan-test: Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity: probability of homoscedasticity; Hausman test for
validity of instruments; instruments are the average annual growth rate of birth and of death; Moran-I test for
spatial autocorrelation (** indicates significance at 5%-level obtained from percentiles of a bootstrap);
Hence, we can conclude that divergence in growth processes between centers
and peripheries is established on NUTS3 level, while evidence on NUTS2 level is
somewhat weaker. The wavelength of agglomeration forces seems to be thus quite
s m a l li nE u r o p e ,w h i l ei ta p p e a r e dq u i t el a r g ei nt h eU S .I nc o n t r a s t ,w ed on o t
¯nd evidence of divergence for Japanese prefectures. These results are consistent
with our theoretical model. Note that countries with low population density face
higher transport costs. Then, our theoretical model predicts that countries with high
transportation costs, i.e. low overall population density, like the US may be in the
divergence regime of the model, while countries with low transport costs because of
high population density like Japan are in the convergence regime. Europe which has
33an intermediate population density may show some weaker tendency of divergence.
An alternative explanation could be the activeness of regional economic policy which
is very pronounced in Japan48, less pronounced in Europe and little active in the US.
However, we do not investigate into the impact of regional economic policy in this
paper.
4C o n c l u s i o n
We asked the question whether regional income divergence exists and is caused by
agglomeration forces as opposed to other divergence forces such as those assumed
implicitly by the EU regional economic policy.
We merge an economic geography model with a neoclassical growth model and
derive from the model that centers distinguish from peripheries in the sense of theory
by a larger population density. Also, theory predicts that centers become permanently
richer than peripheries.
We derive from the theoretical model a reduced form which can be directly
tested using threshold regression techniques. We apply this technique to data on US
states, Japanese prefectures and European regions. We check robustness by vary-
ing the sample period 1950-1980 versus 1980-1996, the regional disaggregation level
(NUTS1, NUTS2 and NUTS3) for European regions and the use of di®erent control
variables and di®erent threshold variables.
First, we ¯nd that US states with a high population density tend to grow
signi¯cantly faster than regions with low population density. Japanese prefectures
do not grow in dependence of their population density. In Europe, there is some
signi¯cant income divergence between centers and peripheries since 1980 on NUTS2
level. The di®erence is stronger on NUTS3 level. An average person that decided to
live in a center rather than a periphery in 1980 would have had an annual income gain
48We thank Prof. Hashimoto for pointing this out to us.
34of on average 719 Euros in 1996. Part of this income gain is explained by the choice
of higher education, while living in centers.
Of the EU regional economic policy eligibility criteria decline of the manufac-
turing sector of a region may call for temporary policies. Surprisingly, our threshold
variable population density fares superior to initial income which is one of the main
eligibility criteria for regional aid of the EU commision. If regional economic policy
is e®ective, then we recommend to focus on measures that redirect demand for high-
skilled labour towards peripheries. For example, universities or government agencies
may be relocated towards peripheries.
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38Appendix
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1.
(a) In the following we denote ¯xed points by bars. We de¯ne the steady state con-
ditions from equations (14) and the deterministic counterpart of (18), where we take
into account that the variable pairs Lt and L¤
t and At and A¤
t grow by assumption































First, we show that there exists at least one steady state equilibrium. (i) If N =0 ,
then ½
¯ ¯









¯g(N;½)=0 = t¡ 1
¾ < 1: Then, there must exist at least one steady state solution
by the intermediate value theorem, because the functions of (25) are continuous.



























The equation (26) can be transformed into a polynomial of degree 3, which has at
most three solutions by Descartes' rule of sign.
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is a necessary condition for the existence of three equilibria by the intermediate value
theorem and (i) and (ii). Hence, the steady state equilibrium must be stable, if it is
unique. If there exist three steady state equilibria N¤;N ¤¤; and N¤¤¤, N¤ <N ¤¤ <
N¤¤¤, then the equilibria N¤ and N¤¤¤ must be stable and N¤¤ unstable by the inter-
mediate value theorem, (i) and (ii), and the above inequality. Q.E.D.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2. If L¤
0 = L0 + !, !>0a n dK¤
0 = K0. Then,
n¤
t >n t for all t by forward induction of (17) and using (14). Hence, N>1; ½>1.
Vice versa, if L¤
0 + ! = L0, !>0a n dK¤
0 = K0. Then, n¤
t <n t for all t by forward
39induction of (17) and using (14). Hence, N<1; ½<1. Finally, if L¤
0 = L0 and
K¤
0 = K0.T h e n ,n¤
t = nt for all t by forward induction of (17) and using (14). Hence,
N =1 ; ½ =1 . Q.E.D.
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 3.49






tEt [lnCt]( 2 9 )
s.t.:
Kt+1 = ¼tnt ¡ Ct;
Lt = t ¤ a0 + ºt;
L
¤
t = t ¤ a0 + º
¤
t;
together with (12), the familiar boundary conditions and initial conditions for the
capital stocks and the initial values of the population and technology shocks. Recall
that the deterministic population growth trend t¤a0 is identical in both regions, while
there may be i.i.d. random °uctuations vt;v ¤
t around it. The ¯rst order conditions







where ¸t is the Lagrange-multiplier associated with the constraint in (29). It must be
shown that the ¯rst order conditions (30)-(31) are ful¯lled for the guess (16).
Combining (30) and (31), taking logarithm, and solving for ln¸t yields:
ln¸t = ¡lnCt +l n" +l n¼t +l nnt ¡ lnKt: (32)
The logarithm is taken from (31) and equation (32) is inserted:



















=l n" ¡ d0 ¡ ln(1 ¡ d0) ¡ ln¼t ¡ lnnt;
where the second line is obtained by inserting the constraint in (29). The guess (16)
is inserted into the left hand side of (33) and equalized to (34):
lnd +l n" =l n( 1¡ d0): (35)
Since the parameter d0 is chosen to be d0 =1¡ d", the guess (16) ful¯lls the ¯rst
order conditions (30) and (31). Q.E.D.
49The proof follows closely Chow (1997).
40Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 4.
Let the home region be the center. We need ¯rst an auxiliary result. We note from








where the second equality follows from (9). Hence, the real returns to human capital








Second, notice that (K¤
t =Kt) ! 0 implies that Nt ! 0; since L¤
t=Lt is bound between
0 and in¯nity by the assumption of immobility of some workers. But if (K¤
t =Kt) ! 0,
then (r¤





t < 1,a sNt ! 0, where the inequality can easily be





¡! 1; as Nt ! 0: (38)
>From the continuity property of real returns to human capital, (37), (38), and the





> 1; if N
¤ <N t <N
¤¤ or Nt >N
¤¤¤ (39)
and the reverse inequality else.
Now, we are ready for the main proof. There is no migration at a distribution of labour
(L¤=L)=l=(1 + l) < 1, if there is no incentive for any inhabitant of the center i to














































because we assumed that human capital is embodied in migrants. It su±ces to show
that in period t0 a worker who moves from the center to the periphery has both less


































which is true, since the ¯rst term in the curley brackets is larger than 1 by (39), as
long as the population growth shocks are not too large to switch the steady state from





















a n dt h u s( 4 4 )h o l d sb yJ e n s e n ' si n e q u a l i t y .
There is a fraction of l=2 mobile workers in the periphery who move to the center
in period 1. The worker distribution of the center relative to the periphery is thus
(1 + l)=l . This distribution does not change anymore, since there are only immobile
o®springs left in the periphery and the mobile o®springs in the center have no incentive
to move to the periphery. Thus, the population in center and periphery grow both
at the same average rate and the relative distribution remains constant except for
temporary population growth shocks. Q.E.D.
Appendix 5: Data Description
(a) Eurostat NUTS2 Data
The data for the European regions are taken from the CD-Rom version of the Eurostat
Regio Database (2001). Eurostat provides data by 4 di®erent regional classi¯cations
of regions, using their Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS): NUTS
0 generally corresponds to countries, NUTS 1 to states, NUTS 2 to a group of com-
munities or cities, and Nuts 3 to single cities or communities. Eurostat (1995) also
calls NUTS 2 regions "Basic Regions", and describes these as the appropriate level for
analysing regional-national problems. Therefore, we use the data classi¯ed according
to NUTS 2.
More speci¯cally, NUTS 2 regions correspond to national administrative units in Aus-
tria (BundeslÄ ander), Belgium (Provinces), Finland (Suuralueet), Germany (Regierungs-
bezirke), Greece (Development Regions), Italy (Regioni), Netherlands (Provincies),
Portugal (Commissaoes de Coordenacao Regional), and Sweden (Riksomrº aden). NUTS
2 regions also correspond to national administrative units, but with exceptions, in
France (R¶ egions, plus the four departments d'Outre Mer), and Spain (Communidades
Aut¶ onomas, plus Ceuta y Melilla). Three member states are classi¯ed as a single
NUTS 2 region: Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg. In the UK, groups of Counties
have been introduced as an intermediate (NUTS 2) level between NUTS 2 (Standard
regions) and NUTS 3 (a combination of Counties and Local Authority Regions) units.
Our data used in the regressions covers the period 1980 to 1996. In the 2001 CD Rom
there is also data for the subsequent years, but they are prepared following a new
42European System of Accounts (ESA95) which replaces the old one (ESA79), on which
our data is based and lacks comparability.
This choice of period restricts the list of countries from which regional data could
be used to Belgium, Denmark, France, (Western) Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Within these countries we exclude
all islands except Sicilia (Italy), which is only separated from Calabria (Italy) by the
3300 metres-wide Strait of Messina.
We also had to exclude Berlin, since from 1990 onwards East- and West-Berlin appears
as only one region in the dataset. Three regions of the Netherlands (Flevoland, Over-
ijssel, Gelderland) did not have data for GDP per capita in 1980 or 1981 and had to
be excluded as well. Finally, Groningen was the richest European region in 1980 with
by far the worst growth performance, because North Sea oil activities were attributed
somewhat arti¯cially to this region. Therefore we follow Neven and Gouyette (1995)
and exclude this region, too.
This reduces the total of 210 NUTS 2 region available in Eurostat (2001) to 154 regions
o fw h i c ht h e r ea r e1 1i nB e l g i u m ,3 0i nW e s t - G e r m a n y ,1r e g i o nD e n m a r k ,1 5r e g i o n s
in Spain, 21 regions in France, 10 regions in Greece, 1 region Ireland, 19 regions in
Italy, 1 region Luxembourg, 9 regions in the Netherlands, 5 regions in Portugal, and
27 in the UK. We have obtained the observations for the UK from an older version of
the Regiostat CD using an older NUTS2 classi¯cation. The UK NUTS2 regions were
re-classi¯ed recently and no data are available except for the most recent years for the
new classi¯cation. Similarly, the old classi¯cation is used for Ireland. The observation
for London in 1981 is missing on the Eurostat CD and is replaced by information
of the hardcopy version of the Eurostat "Annual Yearbook of Regional Statistics".
When constructing country dummies, one country dummy is formed for Ireland and
Luxembourg who both had similarly exceptional growth performances thanks to their
tax policies. Denmark is considered as a German region, as it has a similar growth
performance as German regions.
Table A1 provides an overview of the variables used.
Table A1: NUTS2 Summary Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
GDP growth p.c. 154 0.0595 0.007 0.040 0.089
Population growth 154 0.003 0.003 -0.007 0.013
Initial Income 154 8.80 0.26 8.08 9.49
Population density 154 0.357 0.713 0.02 6.22
Patent applications 101 -3.32 1.63 -6.90 -0.69
Share of agricultural employment 126 0.028 0.25 0.001 0.142
Percentage change in share of
manufacturing employment
91 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.03
Human capital 100 2.80 0.32 1.79 3.47
The variables are de¯ned as follows:
GDP growth: Average growth rate of GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards
(PPS) between 1980 and 1996 (in log). For a few regions there is no GDP data for
1980, so that instead 1981 data is used. GDP data is not de°ated. The EU-12 (excl.
Greece, UK, Sweden) GDP de°ator of OECD Economic Indicators for the period 1980
to 1996 is 5.2%.
Population growth: Average population growth rate between 1980 and 1996 (in log);
Initial income: GDP per capita in PPS as of 1980 (in log); In few cases initial income
was not available in 1980, but in 1981 instead.
Population density: Population (in 1000s) per km2;
Patents: Patent applications per million inhabitants (in log);
43Share of agricultural employment: People employed in agriculture, ¯sheries, mining
and forestry as a share in total population in 1990 (in log). 1990 was chosen since this
substantially increased the number of observations compared to 1980.
Human capital: People aged 25-59 with \high" educational attainment (ISCED 5,6,7)
as a share of population aged 25-59 (in log) in 1993;
Decline of manufacturing employment: Share of manufacturing employment in popu-
lation of 1990 minus share of manufacturing employment in population in 1980;
A r e a :A r e ao ft h er e g i o ni nk m 2;
We construct the instrumental variables by decomposing population growth into its
components birth rate, death rate, and net immigration over the period 1980/1981-
1996. Then, we annualize the contributions of the death rate and birth rate to the
population growth rate and use the resulting variables as instruments.
(b) Eurostat NUTS3 Data
Eurostat-NUTS3 data cover 1980-1996 and 1982-1996 for the regions of the Nether-
lands. Of the 1082 NUTS3 regions, we have observations only on 592 regions which
stem from 6 countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and
Spain. We have excluded islands as for NUTS2 regions (except for the Greek islands)
and we have lost the observations on East Germany and West-Berlin. The de¯ni-
tions of the variables is given as for NUTS2 regions above. Table A2 summarizes the
observations by country and table A3 gives a summary statistics for all variables.








Belgium 43 43 41
France 94 88 88
Germany 444 329 325
Greece 51 51 10
Netherlands 40 32 32
Spain 51 49 37
Table A3: NUTS3 Summary Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
gdpgrow 592 .0537413 .0101874 .0138308 .0859327
initinc 592 8.797134 .3441952 7.857442 10.14747
popgrow 592 .0046021 .0047403 -.0131378 .020131
patents 533 -2.471947 1.183849 -6.232776 .1918546
popdense 592 .4713863 1.139194 .0095169 20.89848
(c) Barro and Sala-i-Martin Data
The other data used in order to compare our results directly to previous research is
the same as used and published in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), i.e. for Japanese
Prefectures 1955-1990, US states 1900-1990 and European regions for the period 1950
to 1990. The data is described at length in their book.
44